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 Abstract 
 
There is growing international interest in a Canadian-style points system for selecting 
economic immigrants.  Although existing points systems have been influenced by the 
human capital literature, the findings have traditionally been incorporated in an ad hoc 
way.  This paper explores a formal method for designing a points system based on a 
human capital earnings regression for predicting immigrant economic success.  The 
method is implemented for Canada using the IMDB, a remarkable longitudinal database 
that combines information on immigrants’ characteristics at landing with their subsequent 
income performance as reported on tax returns.  We demonstrate the feasibility of the 
method by developing an illustrative points system.  We also explore how the selection 
system can be improved by incorporating additional information such as country-of-
origin characteristics and intended occupations.  We discuss what our findings imply for 
the debate about the relative merits of points- and employment-based systems for 
selecting economic immigrants.   
  11. Introduction 
  There is growing international interest in a Canadian-style points system for 
selecting economic immigrants.
2  At the same time, there is rising concern in Canada 
about the income performance of recent cohorts of economic immigrants, as many of 
those selected through the points system struggle in the labour market (Aydemir and 
Skuterud, 2005; Picot, Hou, and Coulombe, 2007).  In this paper, we explore a new 
approach to the design and evaluation of a points-based selection system.   The basic idea 
is that the system is designed based on the human capital earnings regression that best 
predicts the earnings of immigrants.   We apply this approach to the design of a points 
system for Canada using the Longitudinal Immigrant Database (IMDB) to develop the 
prediction model.   The IMDB is a remarkable dataset that combines information on the 
human capital characteristics of immigrants at landing with income data derived from 
post-landing tax filings, and is uniquely suited to developing our design approach.   
  The design of the existing points system has undoubtedly been influenced by the 
vast empirical literature relating immigrant characteristics at landing to their subsequent 
economic performance.  One indication is that the measured human capital—most 
notably educational attainment—of immigrants admitted under the points system has 
increased dramatically (see, e.g., Beach, Green, and Worsick, 2006; Picot and Sweetman, 
2005).    But the design process has followed what can fairly be called a clinical rather 
than an actuarial approach: that is, it has depended on expert judgment rather than an 
explicit statistically-based design.
3   With the multiple objectives that are weighed in any 
                                                 
2 Points systems are also used for skills-based selection in Australia and New Zealand.  The United 
Kingdom is in the process of introducing a permanent system to replace its points-based Highly Skilled 
Migrant Programme that was first introduced on a pilot basis in 2002 (United Kingdom Home Office, 
2006).   Points systems are under consideration in France, Ireland and Spain.  In Germany, a points system 
went down to a narrow legislative defeat in 2003.   A points system was not part of the comprehensive 
immigration reform passed by the U.S. Senate in May of 2006, although it was the subject of hearings of 
the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions in September (see Beach, 2006).   
3 The clinical-actuarial distinction is common in psychology, jurisprudence and medicine.   A large 
literature has developed following Meehl (1954) that compares the predictive success of the two methods.  
The actuarial method has generally found to be superior where the two methods have access to the same 
information (see, e.g., Dawes, Faust, and Meehl, 1989).  Of course, where an expert (i.e. clinician) has 
access to information unavailable to someone using the statistical model, it is quite possible that the former 
will make more accurate predictions.  For example, a visa officer interviewing an applicant could make a 
judgment about the individual’s social skills and ambition, information that would not be available to the 
statistical model.   However, the use of this type of information is not what is at issue in the design of a 
system that is dependent on objectively verifiable information.  The design problem relates to how best to 
weigh the various available pieces of information (educational attainment, fluency in official languages, 
  2selection system (economic, fiscal, humanitarian, family reunification, etc.), it is 
inevitable that judgment is applied in the system’s overall design.   However, we think an 
approach that focuses directly on predicted earnings is both appropriate and feasible for 
the economic immigrant stream, where the objective is selecting high-earning immigrants 
that will strengthen the economy and fiscal system for the benefit of the pre-immigration 
population.
4    
  We thus develop an actuarial—or optimal-prediction-based-on-historical-data—
approach to the design of the system for selecting economic immigrants.  The central idea 
is to use data on the landing characteristics and subsequent income performance of earlier 
immigrant cohorts to identify the “best” human capital-based prediction equation.   This 
equation is combined with an explicit threshold for predicted earnings below which 
applicants are not accepted.  The point allocations are then objectively mapped from the 
parameters of this prediction equation given the chosen threshold.   We also develop the 
concept of the selection frontier as a means for evaluating selection systems.   The 
frontier shows the tradeoff between the expected earnings of the pool of admitted 
immigrants and the number of immigrants admitted, with each point on the frontier 
mapping to a unique predicted earnings threshold.   The position of the frontier will 
depend on predictive success of the underlying earnings regression, with the best 
prediction equation leading to the highest feasible frontier.     
  Although there is growing interest in points systems among industrial countries, 
there is also a debate about their effectiveness.   One view is that the quality of a 
country’s immigrant stream is dominated by the pool of people who desire to move to the 
country (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 2005).   This suggests that fine-tuning the selection 
                                                                                                                                                 
etc.)  In this equal-information setting, it is harder to see an advantage for expert judgment over statistical 
models that are chosen to best fit the historical data.   
4 Even from a narrow economic perspective of those already present in the host country, a better measure 
of economic value is the “surplus” that the country gains from the immigrants.  This surplus can be defined 
as the value the country receives less what they must pay to the immigrants.  Simple models show that it is 
not necessarily the most highly skilled immigrants that generate the greatest surplus (see, e.g., Borjas, 
1995).  However, the relevance of human capital is likely to increase when we allow for fiscal effects, 
knowledge spillovers, or the value of specialized skills.  Augmenting the relative supply of skilled workers 
should also reduce overall earnings inequality, so that skilled recruitment can be desirable on both 
efficiency and equity grounds.  But whatever the merits of focusing narrowly on skills, it is the case that a 
number of countries are striving to select more skilled and higher earning immigrant pools.  It is thus 
worthwhile to look for a more systematic approach to designing a skills-based selection system. 
 
  3system is unlikely to have significant effects.   Another view holds that the design of the 
selection system does have first order effects on immigrant labour market success (see, 
e.g., Lester and Richardson on the comparison of the Canadian and Australian points 
systems).   The actuarial approach allows us to examine the potential for fine-tuning a 
conventional points system, say by adjusting allocations to the usual point sources such 
as education, experience and language skills.   Subject to data availability, this approach 
also allows us explore, in a systematic, way the potential contribution of less 
conventional sources of points that have been suggested by the human-capital literature 
(country-of-origin, achievement on literacy tests, quality of educational institution, pre-
emigration earnings, etc.).    By exploring the performance of the best designed point 
systems, the actuarial approach should help inform whether there is a need for more 
radical departures from points-based selection, such as strict pre-immigration job offer 
requirements or probationary periods on temporary work visas before permanent 
immigration status is granted.    
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we review the 
related literature on immigrant assimilation and the effectiveness of selection systems.  
We then describe our design methodology in Section 3 and our data in Section 4.  Section 
5 then develops an illustrative points system and discusses various extensions.   Section 6 
concludes with a discussion of what our results imply about the effectiveness of even the 
best designed points system.     
 
2.  Related literature 
  Following Chiswick (1978), a large literature has developed that explores how 
human capital characteristics at landing affect an immigrant’s subsequent labour market 
success.  A major theme in this literature is how more recent immigrant cohorts to the 
United States compare with earlier cohorts in terms of entry earnings and subsequent 
earnings growth (e.g. Borjas, 1985; Duleep and Regets, 2002).   A substantial parallel 
literature has developed looking at Canadian immigrants.  A central focus has been the 
declining performance of more recent immigrant cohorts relative to native-born workers 
(Abbot and Beach, 1993; Baker and Benjamin, 1994; Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson, 
1995; Grant, 1999; Frenette and Morissette, 2003; Green and Worswick, 2004; Aydemir 
  4and Skuterud, 2005; Picot, Hou, and Coulombe; 2007).   Two important findings have 
been that immigrants that come at young ages tend to perform better (possibly reflecting 
the acquisition of Canadian schooling) and that there is a negligible return to foreign 
experience.
5   A number of recent studies have looked at how less traditional human 
capital measures are associated with labour market performance: credential acquisition or 
“sheepskin effects” (Ferrer and Riddel, 2004); source-country educational quality 
(Sweetman, 2004); and literacy skills (Ferrer, Green, and Riddell, 2004; Alboim, Finnie, 
and Meng, 2005).   
  There is also a smaller literature that looks at how alternative immigrant selection 
systems affect immigrant characteristics and performance.  A key issue in this literature is 
whether immigrant quality is affected more by who desires to emigrate to a particular 
host country or by the selection system that the host country employs.  Jasso and 
Rosenzweig (1995) find a small difference between the performance of U.S. immigrants 
screened for skills and those who gain admission based on family ties.    More recently, 
Jasso and Rosenzweig (2005) find little difference in the operation of the employment-
based U.S. and the skills-based Australian selection systems, leading them to conclude 
that the immigrant mix is largely driven by the self-selection decisions of the immigrants.  
Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo (2001) find that immigrants to Australia and Canada do 
have more measured human capital than immigrants to the U.S., but conclude that this 
has more to do with the latter’s geographic and historic ties to Mexico than with 
differences in selection systems.    
  For Canada, Beach, Green, and Worswick (2006) have found variations in the 
Canadian selection system—including variations in the way points are allocated for 
different measures of human capital—do impact the characteristics of the admitted 
immigrants.  Adyemir (2002) develops and empirically implements a model that allows 
for both self-selection and host-country selection, and finds that both are important in 
determining who actually immigrates.  In a direct comparison of the Australian and 
Canadian points-based systems, Lester and Richardson (2004) argue that reforms to the 
                                                 
5 See Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001).   See also Friedberg (2002) for a similar finding of a low return to 
foreign experience for immigrants to Israel.   
  5Australian system explain the recent better performance of the Australian economic 
immigrants (see also Hawthorne, 2005).   
  It is difficult to sum up these substantial literatures.  The immigrant-assimilation 
literature has certainly demonstrated the usefulness of human capital-based earnings 
regressions for predicting immigrant success.  The selection-system literature shows that 
when a system selects for given characteristics it does tend to have an immigration flow 
with those characteristics, but there is less agreement on how much the selection system 
can affect the labour market success of the admitted immigrants.   As far as we can tell, 
there has not been a previous attempt to explore the optimal design of the selection 
system using human capital-based earnings prediction.   With the proposed actuarial 
approach, we hope to identify the optimal selection in a rigorous and transparent way, to 
explore the scope for fine-tuning a conventional points system to improve immigrant 
selection, and to contribute to the debate about the merits of points-based selection.   
 
3.   Optimal Design Methodology 
  In this section, we summarize the basic steps for identifying the optimal points 
system.   (This method builds on McHale and Rogers (2007) to which the reader is 
referred for additional details.)   The inputs for this method are a human capital-based 
earnings regression for making predictions of immigrant labor-market success and a 
(lifetime) predicted-earnings threshold for deciding who to accept.   The outputs are the 
point allocations per unit of each human capital characteristic.   
  To illustrate the basic design approach, we assume that an immigrant’s earnings 
depend only on their years of schooling (Si), years of experience (Ei), and years since 
migration (ti).   Host-country earnings are given by a standard log-linear earnings 
regression:  
 
(1)  .  ) , 0 ( ~ ln
2
3 2 1 0 u it it i i i it it n u u t E S y Y σ β β β β + + + + = =
 
We use regression analysis to obtain a predictor of log earnings,  
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To obtain the log of expected earnings, we use the approximation, 
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Letting Ti  represent the number of years that the immigrant will be in the host labour 
market and letting δ represent the discount rate, we can use (3) to write the present 
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We assume that the immigrant will work until age A , so that  i i A A − = T , where Ai is age 
at landing.  Making this substitution and taking logs yields,  
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We next assume that the policy maker sets a threshold,
* ˆ Z , for predicted lifetime 
earnings.   Any applicant with predicted earnings at or above this level is accepted; others 
rejected.   To obtain the points allocations, we arbitrarily set the point allocation to 100 
for someone with predicted earnings that is exactly equal to the threshold.   With 
                                                 
6 Assuming that there is no out-migration of emigrants, δ will reflect the rate at which the policy maker 
discounts future earnings relative to current earnings.   However, assuming a constant conditional 
probability of exit (or “hazard rate”), δ can also conveniently include a discount due to expected attrition 
due to out-migration.  [Making use of our longitudinal  dataset, we plan to explore the estimation of such 
hazard rates in the next version of the paper.] 
  7predicted earnings set equal to the threshold, we can rearrange equation (5) to obtain the 
per unit points allocation for each of the human capital characteristics.    
   
(6) 
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The respective point allocations for schooling and experience are given by the relevant 
terms in parentheses in equation (6).  The last term in the equation determines the non-
linear point allocations given for age-at landing.   Based on these allocations, any 
applicant that scores 100 points or above has above-threshold predicted earnings and is 
accepted.   
  How do we know if the selection system is performing well?   In Appendix 1, we 
describe an evaluation tool that we call the selection frontier.    This frontier shows the 
trade-off between the “quality” of the selected immigrants as measured by the expected 
value of the admitted pool and the “quantity” (or number) of immigrants admitted.   Each 
point on the frontier is shown is map to a unique predicted earnings threshold.   We show 
in the appendix that improvements in the explanatory power of the regression 
(conveniently measured by the regression R
2) are associated with upward shifts of the 
frontier—i .e. a higher quality pool for any number of immigrants admitted.   The frontier 
provides a useful tool to judge the effectiveness of a given points system and to explore 
the gains from fine tuning the point allocations.   
 
4.   Data
7 
  The actuarial approach to designing a points system depends on the availability of 
historical data on both the characteristics of immigrants at landing and their subsequent 
performance in the labour market.  As mentioned above, the Canadian IMDB is an ideal 
                                                 
7 The information in this section draws heavily on publicly-available documentation of the IMDB provided 
by Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Statistics Canada as well as Abbott (2003) and personal 
communication with CIC employees.    
  8source of both types of data.  The IMDB is an administrative database containing 
information on immigrants to Canada since 1980.  It combines static information from an 
immigrant’s landing records with tax earnings with income data from tax filings.
8  It is 
worth noting that this is not a sample of immigrants, but rather the population of 
immigrants with at least one personal income tax filing.  The database is updated 
annually as new immigrant cohorts arrive and new tax data becomes available.   Tax 
return data is only recorded for the fifteen years after the first tax filing, so that we have 
at most 15 annual income observations on each immigrant.   
  In terms of static (or “tombstone”) data on landing characteristics, it contains 
basic demographic data (sex, age, country of birth); skill measures (English / French 
language ability, native language, years of schooling, educational attainment); intended 
settlement in Canada (province and city, industry and occupation); family status; and 
admission details (immigrant category, applicability of points system, allocation of 
sufficient points for admission, principal applicant flag.)  The dynamic data consists of up 
to 15 years of income data by income type (e.g. employment earnings, investment 
income, rental income etc.)     
  Our interest in this data is principally centered on the economic immigrants as 
opposed to those admitted under the family class or refugees.  We are further interested in 
separating the impact of earnings from returns to capital so we exclude immigrants from 
the investor and entrepreneur classes.  The selection criteria then are: principal applicants 
between the ages of 18 and 64 who enter in IMCAT category 7 (skilled workers principal 
applicant abroad no special program) or IMCAT category 8 (skilled workers principal 
applicant in Canada or with special program).  For this group our dependent variable is 
the log of total earned income, which is the sum of all reported earnings on the 
individual’s tax records. 
  The IMDB does have some limitations.  First, a number of immigrants to Canada 
have never filed a tax return and therefore do not appear in the sample.  Second, 
immigrants can be temporarily or permanently absent from the through return-migration, 
                                                 
8 Public access to the IMDB is strictly constrained given the sensitive nature of the underlying tax and 
personal information.   As a consequence, we cannot have direct access to the data.   We are extremely 
grateful to Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Statistics Canada for generously agreeing to work with 
us to implement the required data runs. 
  9on-migration to a third country, or death.  This results in an unbalanced panel sample.  
Third, the IMDB does not contain reason-codes for individuals not filing a tax return so 
that we can not be sure why an individual has disappeared from the sample. 
  We have supplemented the IMBD data with aggregate variables for both country-
of-destination and country-of origin.  Two aggregate Canadian variables are added to 
control for macroeconomic effects:  the national unemployment rate (CANSIM Table 
282-0002) and the log of average real annual earnings for full time, full year workers 
(CANSIM Table 202-0101).  Three aggregate country-of-origin variables are included to 
control for conditions in the source country that might affect the unobserved human 
capital of immigrants: the log of real GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power 
parity (World Bank, World Development Indicators); the log of distance from Canada 
(taken from Andrew Rose’s bilateral trade database
9); and the 1980-2004 average of the 
Gini coefficient
10 (World Bank, World Development Indicators).   Summary statistics for 
all variables used in the regressions are shown in Table 1.   
 
5.  Empirical Implementation 
5.1 Base Regression 
  To determine the feasibility of the proposed design approach, we first demonstrate 
the development of a simple points system that is linear in experience, language ability 
and educational attainment, and non-linear in age-at-landing.   The base regression from 
which this illustrative points system is derived is shown in Table 2.  We record two 
specifications, the first with and the second without an age-at-landing variable.
11  We also 
record two estimation methods for each specification: ordinary least squares (with 
                                                 
9 Available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/. 
10 The Gini coefficient is only available in household survey years.   These years vary from country to 
country.   
11 Recall that age-at-landing still matters for points even if an age-at-landing variable is not included in the 
regression.   The reason is that age-at-landing determines potential years in the Canadian labour market.  
Although age-at-landing is likely to affect an immigrant’s capacity to adapt to the Canadian labour market, 
we are concerned about our ability to separately identify the age-at-landing and experience effects.   This 
stems from our relatively crude measure of experience: Age-at-Landing – Years of Schooling – 5.   
Controlling for age-at-landing, the experience effect is then identified by variation in years of schooling 
(holding educational attainment constant), which we think is a thin reed on which to base identification.  
We thus concentrate on the results without the age-at-landing variable in developing the illustrative points 
system.  
  10standard errors that are robust to individual immigrant-level clustering); and random 
effects to explicitly take account of serial correlation in individual earnings over time.
12   
  The dependent variable is the log of real annual earnings expressed in constant 
2005 dollars.   We impose the additional restriction that annual earnings are greater than 
$1,000.  We do not include earnings observations for the year of landing, since the length 
of time will typically be less than a full year and will vary across immigrants.  Experience 
is defined as Age at Landing – Years of Schooling – 5.   Language enters as a pair of 
dummy variables: an English dummy that takes the value 1 if English is the immigrant’s 
native language; and a French dummy that takes the value 1 if French is the native 
language.   Educational attainment enters as a set of seven dummy variables (with 
Primary the excluded category):  Secondary, Some Post-Secondary, Trade Certificate, 
Diploma, Bachelors, Masters, and PhD.  We also include a full set of cohort year 
dummies for the years 1981 to 2003 (with 1980 chosen as the excluded cohort).
13  We 
include two variables to control for macro/time effects:  the national unemployment rate 
to control for business cycle effects and trend movements in the underlying structural rate 
of unemployment; and the log of real annual earnings for full time, full year workers to 
control for secular trends in economy-wide earnings.
14   
                                                 
12 We use random effects rather than fixed effects for two reasons.  First, under fixed effects, the 
coefficients on all linear time-invariant explanatory variables cannot be estimated.  In our regressions, most 
of the central variables of interest take this form.  And second, given that our interest is in predicting 
earnings, we are not concerned about correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term (a 
problem that fixed effects can help fix).   Provided that these correlations are stable over time—e.g. high 
educational attainment is stably correlation with unobserved natural abilities that positively affect 
earnings—it is advantageous for earnings predictions to be able to use observed human capital 
characteristics as indicators of unobserved abilities.  We thus do not present our estimated coefficients as 
estimates of the returns to human capital, but rather as associations in the historic data.   
13 There is no 2004 cohort since we include earnings observations only on the first full year after year of 
landing.   
14 The separation of cohort, years-since-migration and macro effects has been a major focus of the 
empirical literature on immigrant earnings.  Since our data from the IMBD is for immigrants only, we 
could not utilize the common identification practice of assuming that marco effects are equal for 
immigrants and natives.  We did explore the method originated independently by Hall (1971) and Mason et 
al. (1973) of including a full set of both cohort and time dummies (in addition to the year-since-migration 
variable), and imposing the identification constraint that either two of the cohort dummies or two of the 
time dummies have equal coefficients.  As is well-described by Glenn (2005), the results can be highly 
sensitive to the chosen identification constraint.   Some experimentation with alternative conditions showed 
this to be the case with our data.  Thus, lacking a priori grounds for choosing a restriction, we decided 
against this approach.   We caution, however, that the type of cohort, years-since-migration, macro 
decomposition we are seeking is unavoidably problematic, and additional studies are needed to confirm the 
robustness of our results.   
  11  An obvious concern with our design approach is that the immigrant earnings 
generation process might not be stable over time.   One reason to worry about instability 
is that past immigrants are obviously a selected sample, and the nature of that selection 
may change over time.  We have tried to minimize the instability in two ways.  First, we 
have limited our sample to immigrants who enter as principal applicants in the skilled 
worker stream.   Since these individuals have been selected through the points system, 
they have been selected based on observed human capital characteristics.  With selection 
on observables, even the fact that our historic sample is in an obvious way a “selected 
sample” should not lead to a bias that is sensitive to the precise nature of the selection 
process.  Second, although the composition of the immigrant pool has certainly been 
changing over time (most obviously in the country-of-origin distribution of the admitted 
immigrants), we can crudely capture the changing distribution with cohort dummies.  We 
can then use the regression model that applies to the most recent available cohort for 
projecting forward (or even take account of trends in the cohort effects).
15    
  The estimated human capital equation appears to perform well, with results that 
are broadly consistent with the existing literature.  Focusing on Regression (1), we find a 
small negative effect of foreign experience.   The coefficient on the years-since-migration 
variable shows that immigrant earnings grow at a real rate of roughly 2 percent per-year 
post-landing (after controlling for average economy-wide earnings).  On language, we 
find that English is substantially more highly rewarded than French (approximately a 46 
percent premium versus a 6 percent premium), no doubt reflecting the fact that a 
substantial majority of admitted immigrants move to English-speaking Canada.
16  The 
educational attainment variables broadly show the expected pattern, with the anomaly 
that Secondary shows slightly lower returns than Primary.
17  Interestingly, immigrants 
with a trade certificate have roughly equal earnings to those with some post-secondary 
attainment.  The results show substantial earnings premiums are associated with higher 
                                                 
15 Using just cohort dummies assumes that the coefficients on the human capital characteristics are stable 
over time.   This assumption can be tested and, if necessary, relaxed using cohort-human capital variable 
interactions.   
16 An interesting extension would be to include interactions between the language variables and intended 
province of destination.   This would, for example, allow us to explore the value of French for immigrants 
intending to reside in Quebec.   
17The difference is not statistically significant in our base regression.  The coefficient on Secondary 
becomes positive and statistically significant when we include all streams in the sample.   
  12educational attainment.  Compared to the base category, the premium for a bachelor’s 
degree is approximately 19 percent higher than that for a diploma; a master’s degree has 
a premium that is approximately 11 percent higher than that for bachelors; and a PhD has 
a premium that is approximately 29 percent higher than that for a masters.   The macro 
variables have the expected signs.  Most notably, the coefficient on the economy-wide 
average earnings variable is quantitatively large, with a 1 percent increase in economy-
wide earnings associated with a 2.2 percent increase in immigrant earnings.
18   
  Figure 1 displays the cohort effects (with the excluded cohort for 1980 equal to 
zero).   The pattern of deteriorating cohort earnings holding human capital constant is 
consistent with previous findings—but the extent of the deterioration is dramatic.   
  Overall the regression explains just over 14 percent of the variation in log 
earnings.  While this is broadly in line with the vast literature on human capital-based 
earnings regressions, it is an undeniably low number, suggesting that immigrant earnings 
performance is dominated by idiosyncratic factors.  This is turn suggests fundamental 
limits to the points-based selection approach.   In Section 5.3 we explore how the 
predictive power of the regression might be improved by adding additional observables.   
First, however, we show how a simple quasi-linear points system can be developed based 
on an illustrative regression.   
 
5.2  An Illustrative Points System 
  The points system that is implied by Regression (1, OLS) is shown in Table 3.  
For this illustration, we assume that the discounted lifetime earnings threshold is set at 
$1,500,000 in constant 2004 dollars and the discount rate is set at 0.02.  As described in 
Section 3, any applicant with a combination of characteristics that yields 100 points or 
more will be accepted (since 100 points or more means that lifetime predicted earnings 
that are at least $1,500,000).  The underlying regression is somewhat more complicated 
than the simple example in Section 3, as it includes both cohort and macro effects in 
addition to measures of human capital at landing.  Making the assumption that the most 
recent estimated cohort effect that is available (2003 in our sample) provides the best 
                                                 
18 It is worth noting that this was a period of relatively low growth in economy-wide average earnings (just 
0.5 percent over 1980 to 2004).   Thus even with the high sensitivity to economy-wide earnings, there was 
still relatively low macro-related trend growth in immigrant earnings (approximately 1.1 percent).   
  13indicator of future cohort effects, we add this effect to the regression constant to 
determine the constant for prediction equation for log earnings that underlies the points 
system.  For the macro effects, we set the log of average earnings at its 2005 level 
($47,800) and assume trend growth in earnings equal to the Bank of Canada’s estimate 
for the underlying productivity growth rate (1.5 percent, Bank of Canada, 2006).  We also 
assume that the unemployment rate is constant at its 2005 level (6.8 percent).   
  There are a number of notable features of the resulting point allocations.  First, 
rather than being source of points, experience at landing actually attracts a small points 
penalty.  Second, points for English exceed points for French by a factor of more than 
six.  Third, while the highest point allocations are granted for to those with higher 
educational attainment, the holders of trade certificates also receive substantial points 
(comparable to someone with some post-secondary education).  And fourth, and perhaps 
most surprisingly, age-at-landing has a dramatic impact on points.   In our illustrative 
system, it is practically impossible for someone older than their mid-forties to meet the 
points threshold; on the other hand, it is hard for someone younger than their mid-
twenties not to meet the threshold.  The strong influence of age follows from the 
aggregation of lifetime earnings over potential years in the Canadian labour market (64 – 
Age at Landing).  However, the relative impact of the age-at-landing variable can be 
attenuated by using a higher discount rate (matched by an appropriately lowered 
threshold), which effectively reduces the weight given to later years worked in Canada.  
  It is useful to examine a couple of examples to get a better feel for when someone 
succeeds or fails to make the threshold in this illustrative system.   For our first example, 
we take a 37-year-old native English speaker with a master’s degree and 12 years of 
experience.
19    The projected lifetime earnings of this individual is $1,700,082.   Using 
an appropriately extended version of Equation (4), this projection can usefully be 
decomposed into the product of initial earnings ($38,529) and a factor that depends on 
potential years in Canada, the coefficient on the years since migration variable, the 
discount rate, and the product of the coefficient on the log of average annual earnings 
variable and the assumed growth rate for these earnings (44.124) – check this number.   
We call the latter number “adjusted potential years.”  The point allocations for this 
                                                 
19 We assume they apply in 2005.   
  14applicant are -1.1 for experience, 32.7 for language, 47.8 for educational attainment and 
30.0 for age, for a total of 109.4 points.   This applicant is thus accepted.   For our second 
example, we take a 25-year-old native French speaker with a trade certificate and 5 years 
of experience.  Initial projected earnings are $17,985 and adjusted potential years are 
81.02, for total projected earnings of $1,487,065.   This individual falls just below the 
projected earnings cutoff.   Consistent with the earnings shortfall there is also a points 
shortfall: -0.5 for experience, 4.7 for language, 18.1 for educational attainment and 75.5 
for age, for a total of 97.8.  This applicant is thus rejected.   However, if this individual 
was just one year younger with correspondingly one year less experience they would 
score 101.4 points (with projected lifetime earnings of $1,527,402) and would be 
accepted.  
  Even though this points system is just meant as an illustration, it is interesting to 
compare it the Canada’s existing points grid.   What are comparable are the relative 
points given for various pairs of characteristics rather than the absolute allocations of 
points.  Most strikingly, under the present grid, 25 out of a maximum of 100 points are 
available for experience, while our findings suggest that no—or even slightly negative 
points—should be allocated for experience.  For education, the same points (25) are 
allocated for a PhD and a Masters, which is not far above the points given for a two-year 
university degree (20).  In contrast, our findings identify a much steeper educational 
attainment-points gradient.  On age, the current grid calls for the maximum of age-related 
points to be given for applicants between 21 and 49 (10), with two-points per year 
penalties for each year above or below this range.  Our findings identify both a larger 
relative weighting on age in general, and monotonically falling points with the actual age 
at landing.  Because it is not limited to variables that are available in the IMDB, the 
current points system has the advantage of access to certain information not available to 
us.   This information includes the presence of arranged employment, spouse’s 
educational attainment, years of post-secondary study in Canada, and family relationships 
in Canada.  However, these data could be collected in an expanded IMDB.   We return to 
the benefits of expanding the range of individual data that is collected in the concluding 
comments below.   
 
  155.3  Extended Regressions 
  Taking the IMDB as given, we next explore how enriching the informational base 
for which points are given can lead to a better performing immigrant pool.  We use the R
2 
from the earnings regression as our measure of the predictive success of the selection 
system.   In Appendix 1, we demonstrate how an increase in the R
2 leads to an outward 
shift in the selection frontier, so that the expected earnings of the admitted pool increases 
for any given number of admitted immigrants.  We explore the addition of three types of 
information: non-linear terms for the foreign experience and years-since-migration 
variables; country-of-origin information; and intended-occupation dummies.  To ensure 
valid comparisons, we limit our sample to observations for which all three forms of 
additional information are available.  This causes the number of observations to drop 
from 313,631 to 258,175, and the number immigrants to drop from 50,160 to 43,218.   
  The results are recorded in Table 4.  The first regression is our base regression 
(without the age-at-landing variable) estimated on the restricted sample.  The results are 
very similar to those for the unrestricted sample.  The next three regressions separately 
add the non-linear terms, the country-of-origin variables and the intended-occupation 
dummies to the base regression.  The final regression adds all three forms of additional 
information simultaneously.   
  Regression (2) shows the effects of adding squared terms for Experience and 
Years Since Migration.   The negative coefficient on Experience Squared shows that the 
proportionate earnings penalty on foreign experience rises, cet. par., at an increasing rate 
with the extent of foreign experience.  The coefficient on Years Since Migration Squared 
is also negative, indicating the growth rate of earnings tends to decline, cet. par., with 
years in Canada.  Indeed, on average earnings peak after just over 19 years.  Overall, 
however, adding these squared terms adds minimally to the explanatory power of the 
regression, with the R
2 rising slightly from 0.1501 to 0.1541.   Of course, adding two 
quadratic terms to the regression does not exhaust the potential for non-linearities.   In 
particular, it is would be worthwhile to explore the explanatory power that comes from 
adding additional polynomial terms and interaction effects.       
  Regression (3) shows the effects of adding three country-of-origin variables: the 
log of real GDP per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity); the log of distance 
  16from Canada, and the Gini coefficient (as a measure of source-country inequality).   We 
hypothesized that the coefficient on the GDP per capita variable would be positive, 
reflecting such factors as better matched human capital when the immigrant is coming 
from another developed country with a more similar economy and also better source-
country educational institutions. Our results support this hypothesis, with a 100 percent 
increase in source country GDP per capita resulting in a roughly 10 percent increase in 
earnings.  We next hypothesized that an increase in the distance of the source-country 
from Canada would be positively associated with immigrant earnings.  The reason is that 
the cost of immigrating will tend to rise with distance, and higher costs will increase the 
selection based on unobserved human capital characteristics.   Put more simply, a higher 
cost of emigrating will tip the balance in favour of more skilled immigrants in any for any 
given levels of observed human capital.  This hypothesis also receives support, with a 
100 percent increase in distance leading to approximately an 11 percent increase in 
earnings.  Finally, following Borjas (1987), we hypothesized that an increase in source-
country inequality will tend to reduce immigrant earnings.  The reason is that, where 
source-country inequality is high, more skilled individuals have a relatively stronger 
reason to stay at home, which should apply both between and within observed skill 
categories.  Once again the hypothesis receives support, with a 10 point increase in the 
Gini coefficient being associated with an approximately 0.8 percent decrease in 
immigrant earnings.  All told, the addition of the three country-of-origin variables only 
marginally increases the explanatory power of the regression, with the R
2 rising from 
0.1501 to 0.1631.   
  Regression (4) shows the effects of introducing dummies for intended occupation.  
A dummy variable is introduced for each 2 digit National Occupation Classification 
(NOC) code with a number of additional classifications introduced by CIC.   The 
introduction of the occupational dummies does lead to a more substantial improvement in 
the fit of the regression, with the R
2 rising from 0.1501 to 0.1936.   It is worth 
emphasizing that this way of introducing occupation-specific information is quite 
different from the occupation-shortage approach that is, for example, an important aspect 
of the Australian points system.  Under the latter approach, extra points are granted if 
there is deemed to be a shortage in the particular occupation.  In contrast, our approach 
  17looks backwards to the earnings success of past immigrants destined for particular 
occupations.  This has the disadvantage that it looks at past rather than present conditions 
in given occupations, but it has the advantage of focusing on how immigrants have 
actually done when destined for those occupations rather than economically dubious 
measures of shortage.
20  For example, there may be real shortages in certain health-
related professions, but immigrants may face challenges in utilizing their human capital 
in those occupations because of difficulties getting their credentials recognized.   Our 
approach has the merit of recognizing the de facto challenges in given occupations; 
although one could reasonably question the fairness of punishing future applicants 
because of inefficient credential recognition in the past.   
  Table 5 records the occupation effects (measured in log points), which are ordered 
by size of effect.   The omitted category is the CIC category of “new worker” 
(NOCD9914).   A small number of the CIC categories did not contain any observations in 
our sample and are not listed in the table.   The first column of the table records the share 
of our sample destined for the occupation.  Clearly, some of the shares are quite small, so 
that the estimated effects should be treated with some caution.   However, the pattern of 
effects looks largely plausible, with immigrants intending to enter senior management 
earning the largest premium over new workers, while those intending to be homemakers 
earning the lowest.  By far the largest category is NOCD21 “professional occupations in 
natural and applied sciences,” with almost a quarter of the sample.   Workers intending to 
enter this occupational category earn a premium over new workers of approximately 50 
percent.   
  Regression (5) finally adds all three forms of information in a single regression.  
Overall, the fit of the regression increases by more than one-third.   But the percentage of 
variation in log earnings explained is still low at just over 20 percent.   While we 
obviously have not exhausted the types of information that could be used in the 
underlying prediction regression, the evident difficulty of predicting who will succeed 
economically based on observed human capital characteristics at landing leads one to ask 
if there is a better way to select economic immigrants.   We take up this question in the 
concluding section.  
                                                 
20 Often it seems that the term “shortage” is used where there is upward pressure on wages.  
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6.  Concluding Comments 
  Is there a better way to select economic immigrants?  The limited predictive 
power of the models we have explored certainly motivates a search for alternatives.  A 
leading contender is U.S.-style employer-driven selection.  Employers are obviously 
motivated to work hard to identify talented individuals.  They can also utilize a richer 
informational base:  Where did they get their education?  How well do they speak the 
language?  How likely is it that their recommenders value their reputations for honest 
evaluations?  Put simply, employers are well-placed to be “experts” when it comes to 
predicting who will be successful on the job.  While granting that employers often have 
information that cannot easily be integrated into a points system, it is important to 
recognize that there is a vast literature on the superiority of actuarial/statistical-based over 
clinical/expert-based judgment across a range of settings (see Grove et al., 2000, for a 
meta-analysis).
21  This edge is often present even when the clinician has information that 
is not available for the statistical analysis (Grove and Meehl, 1996).   The typical, and for 
many surprising, superiority of the actuarial approach stems from a combination of its 
edge in solving the complex problem of appropriately weighting disparate pieces of 
information and its avoidance of biases that afflict subjective judgment.
22   
  Our prediction, for what its worth, is that employer evaluations will have a critical 
role to play.   But the most effective feasible selection system is likely to be one that 
integrates the informational value of employer assessments into actuarial-based 
predictions.  The evidence from other areas suggests that this should be done, not by 
allowing employers to selectively override the points system, but by turning the employer 
information sources of points.  This could be done, for example, by giving points based 
on the existence of job offers, salary offers, past home-country salaries, and so on.  
                                                 
21 Paul Meehl, a pioneer in the making of these comparisons, sums up the literature as follows: 
There is no controversy in social science which shows such a large body of qualitatively diverse 
studies coming out so uniformly in the same direction as this one.  When you are pushing over 100 
investigations, predicting everything from the outcome of football games to the diagnosis of liver 
disease, and when you can hardly come up with a half dozen studies showing even a weak 
tendency in favor of the clinician, it is time to draw a practical conclusion (Quoted in, Ayres, 
2007, p. 127).   
22 See Ayers (2007, Chapter 5) for an accessible recent discussion.   
 
  19  The Australian experience also suggests that better selections can be made by 
improving the informational quality of the type of variables that are currently used: better 
language ability testing through formal language tests, say; or better measures of 
educational attainment by making use of objective rankings of educational institutions.  
Since the actuarial method looks backwards to determine the optimal weights to place the 
various pieces of predictive information, it is important to begin collecting the more fine-
grained information as soon as possible.  For the IMBD, this means adding new variables 
to the “tombstone data” part of the database.   This additional data could be collected on a 
random sample of admitted immigrants until it has proven its value for prediction.  
Notwithstanding the challenges of predicting immigrant success, if the policy objective is 
to bring in individuals who will succeed economically, an actuarially-based selection 
system operating on an appropriately rich informational base will be hard to trump.  
  20Appendix 1.  The Selection Frontier 
 
  The selection frontier shows the menu of choices available to the policy maker 
given the human-capital based earnings regression used to predict immigrant success.   
More precisely, the frontier shows the tradeoff between the expected earnings of the 
admitted pool and the number of immigrants admitted.  Choosing a point on the frontier 
is equivalent to choosing a predicted-earnings threshold.   The combination of the 
threshold and equation (6) then completely defines the points system.   
  To identify the frontier, we assume that the actual host-country earnings of the 
applicant pool (i.e. the pool of individuals who desire to emigrate to the potential host-
country) are log-normally distributed.   (For simplicity, we restrict attention to the case of 
a single-period immigrant horizon in the host-country.)  In McHale and Rogers (2007), 
we show that this implies that actual earnings and predicted earning of potential 
immigrants are joint-normally distributed with a correlation coefficient equal to the 
coefficient of determination (R
2) in the prediction regression.   The admitted pool is then 
an incidental truncation of the applicant pool, with selection into the applicant pool based 
on a comparison on predicted earnings and the predicted-earnings threshold.   Letting   
be the single-year predicted earnings threshold (and dropping i subscripts for notational 
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The selection frontier is shifted upwards—and thus the tradeoff facing the policy maker 
improved—by an increase in the mean earnings of the applicant pool (Y ), an increase in 
the variance of log earnings in the applicant pool ( ), and a reduction in the variance of 





  The selection frontier and the associated predicted-earnings thresholds are shown 
in Figure 1 for the case where Y = $65,000,   = 0.4, and   = 0.32.  Note that the 





2 from the earnings regression is equal to 0.2.   
Figure 2 shows how improvements in the predictive accuracy of the of human-capital 
earnings regression (here captured by increases in the R
2) leads to increases in expected 
earnings for any given share of the applicant pool that is admitted.  The selection frontier 
thus allows us to explore how improvements in the ability to predict immigrant labour 
market leads to changes in the average “quality” of selected immigrants. 
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 Table 1.  Summary Statistics
Obs. Median Mean S.D
Individual Variables
Log Annual Earnings (constant 2005 Dollars) 314,892 10.44 10.29 0.95
Landing Year 314,892 1991 1991 6.49
Tax Year 314,892 1998 1996 5.97
Age at Landing 314,892 32 33 7.14
Years Since Migration 314,892 5 6 3.80
Years of Schooling 313,631 15 14 3.83
Experience 313,631 12 14 7.70
English Language (mother tounge) 314,892 0 0.21 0.41
French Language (mother tounge) 314,892 0 0.05 0.21
Primary 314,892 0 0.09 0.28
Secondary 314,892 0 0.14 0.34
Some Post-Secondary 314,892 0 0.07 0.26
Trade Certificate 314,892 0 0.14 0.34
Diploma 314,892 0 0.11 0.31
Bachelors 314,892 0 0.32 0.47
Masters 314,892 0 0.10 0.29
PhD 314,892 0 0.04 0.19
Macro Variables 
Unemployment Rate 314,892 0.078 0.086 0.01
Log Average Annual Earnings (constant dollars) 314,892 10.75 10.73 0.04
Country-of-Origin Variables 
Log GDP-Per-Capita 284,866 8.36 8.62 1.01
Log Distance (from Canada) 299,074 8.66 8.52 0.36
Gini 279,736 39.33 39.77 7.30
Sample includes Skilled Workers, Principal Applicants (IMCAT categories 7 & 8) with earnings > $1,000Table 2.  Basic Log Earnings Regressions 
Skilled Workers, Principal Applicants
Dependent Variable = Log Annual Earnings
OLS Random Effects OLS Random Effects
Age at Landing . . .  . . .  0.0201 * 0.0170 *
(0.0020) (0.0021)
Years Since Migration 0.0202 * 0.0142 * 0.0202 * 0.0142 *
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.009) (0.0006)
Experience -0.0013 ** -0.0023 * -0.0203 * -0.0184 *
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0021)
English Language 0.4366 * 0.5268 * 0.4292 * 0.5197 *
(0.0094) (0.0105) (0.0094) (0.0105)
French Language 0.0621 * 0.1403 * 0.0655 * 0.1422 *
(0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0164) (0.0174)
Secondary -0.0026 0.0009 -0.0837 -0.0666 *
(0.0154) (0.0120) (0.0172) (0.0216)
Some Post-Secondary 0.2331 * 0.2150 * 0.0858 * 0.0910 *
(0.0189) (0.0223) (0.0236) (0.0270)
Trade Certificate 0.2421 * 0.2212 * 0.1319 * 0.1276 *
(0.0161) (0.0202) (0.0192) (0.0232)
Diploma 0.3315 * 0.3161 * 0.1862 * 0.1940 *
(0.0170) (0.0208) (0.0219) (0.0257)
Bachelors 0.5291 * 0.5037 * 0.3463 * 0.3515 *
(0.0154) (0.0188) (0.0232) (0.0266)
Masters 0.6383 * 0.5846 * 0.4188 * 0.4020 *
(0.0182) (0.0209) (0.0279) (0.0380)
PhD 0.9294 * 0.8862 * 0.6602 * 0.6606 *
(0.0218) (0.0259) (0.0340) (0.0380)
Unemployment Rate -3.3675 * -3.8351 * -3.3743 * -3.8357 *
(0.1500) (0.1067) (0.1500) (0.1067)
Log Average Annual Earnings 2.2447 * 2.6093 * 2.2454 * 2.6095 *
(0.1129) (0.0832) (0.1129) (0.0832)
Cohort Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes
R Squared 0.1410 0.1386 0.1423 0.1400
    Within . . . 0.0607 . . . 0.0607
    Between . . . 0.1352 . . . 0.1362
Root Mean Square Error  0.8770 . . . 0.0876 . . .
Observations 313,631 313,631 313,631 313,631
Individuals 50,610 50,610 50,610 50,610
Standard errors are in parentheses; OLS standard errors are robust to individual-level clustering.
* = signficance at 1% level; ** = significance at 5% level.  
Sample includes Skilled Workers, Principal Applicants (IMCAT categories 7 & 8) with annual earnings > $1,000
(1) (2)Table 3.  Ilustrative Points System 
Points threshold = 100; Points allocations based on Regression 1 (OLS), Table 2
Experience (per year) -0.1
Language
    English 32.7
    French 4.7
Eduational Attainment
    Secondary -0.2
    Some Post-Secondary 17.5
    Trade Certificate 18.1
    Diploma  24.8
    Bachelors 39.6
    Masters 47.8
    PhD 69.6
Age at Landing Age at Landing (continued)
63 -252.4 40 16.8
62 -199.2 39 21.3
61 -167.5 38 25.7
60 -144.7 37 30.0
59 -126.7 36 34.2
58 -111.7 35 38.3
57 -98.9 34 42.3
56 -87.5 33 46.2
55 -77.4 32 50.1
54 -68.2 31 53.9
53 -59.7 30 57.6
52 -51.8 29 61.3
51 -44.5 28 64.9
50 -37.5 27 68.5
49 -31.0 26 72.0
48 -24.8 25 75.5
47 -18.9 24 78.9
46 -13.2 23 82.3
45 -7.8 22 85.7
44 -2.5 21 89.0
43 2.6 20 92.3
42 7.5 19 95.6
41 12.2 18 98.8
Assumptions:
1.  Lifetime earnings threshold (constant 2004 dollars)   1,500,000
2.  Assumed trend growth in average annual earnings   1.50%
3.  Average Earnings in 2003 (full year, full time)  48,700
4.  Unemployment rate in 2003 6.8%
5.  Discount rate (δ)  0.02Table 4.  Extended OLS Regressions: Skilled Workers, Principal Applicants
Non-linearities, Country of Origin, Intended Occupations
Dependent Variable = Log Annual Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years Since Migration 0.0183 * 0.0763 * 0.0190 * 0.0191* 0.0784 *
(0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0019)
Years Since Migration Squared . . . -0.0040 * . . . . . . -0.0041 *
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience -0.0018 * 0.0044 * -0.0013 * -0.0042* -0.0006 *
(0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0016)
Experience Squared . . . -0.0002 * . . . . . . -0.0001 *
(0.0000) (0.0000)
English Language 0.4774 * 0.4805 * 0.4242 * 0.4418* 0.4166 *
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0118) (0.0101) (0.0112)
French Language 0.0525 * 0.0587 * -0.0654 * 0.0987* 0.0222
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0185) (0.0173) (0.0181)
Secondary -0.0009 -0.0066 -0.0275 0.0212 -0.0067
(0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0170)
Some Post-Secondary 0.2700 * 0.2637 * 0.2378 * 0.2081* 0.1863 *
(0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0213) (0.0210) (0.0209)
Trade Certificate 0.2523 * 0.2437 * 0.1855 * 0.1623* 0.1184 *
(0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0182) (0.0178) (0.0175)
Diploma 0.3610 * 0.3532 * 0.3051 * 0.2433* 0.2101 *
(0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0192) (0.0195) (0.0194)
Bachelors 0.5395 * 0.5326 * 0.5029 * 0.3526* 0.3376 *
(0.0179) (0.0180) (0..0174) (0.0186) (0.0185)
Masters 0.6469 * 0.6418 * 0.6298 * 0.4394* 0.4412 *
(0.0206) (0..0206) (0.0201) (0.0126) (0.0215)
PhD 0.9345 * 0.9295 * 0.9067 * 0.7185* 0.7142 *
(0.0239) (0..0239) (0.0233) (0.0258) (0.0255)
Unemployment Rate -3.0114 * -2.7417 * -3.0245 * -3.0247* -2.7636 *
(0.1677) (0.1673) (0.1667) (0.1648) (0.1641)
Log Average Annual Earnings 2.4380 * 2.3702 * 2.3806 * 2.4184* 2.3143 *
(0.1238) (0.1231) (0..1236) (0.1221) (0.1213)
Log GDP Per Capita . . . . . . . 0.0971 * . . . 0.0782 *
(0.0048) (0.0047)
Log Distance . . . . . . . 0.1103 * . . . 0.1018 *
(0.0146) (0.0141)
Gini . . . . . . . 0.0083 * . . . -0.0062 *
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Cohort Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Dummies No No No Yes Yes
R Squared 0.1501 0.1541 0.1631 0.1936 0.2040
Root MSE 0.8768 0.8748 0.8708 0.8542 0.8487
Observations 258,175 258,175 258,175 258,175 258,175
Immigrants 43,218 43,218 43,218 43,218 43,218
Standard errors are in parentheses; OLS standard errors are robust to individual-level clustering.
* = signficance at 1% level; ** = significance at 5% level.  
Sample includes Skilled Workers, Principal Applicants (IMCAT categories 7 & 8) with annual earnings > $1,000Table 5.   Estimates of Occupation Effects
Based on Regression (4), Table 4
Share Cofficient Stand.  Error
Omitted Occupational Category, NOCD9914, New worker (CIC) 6.036% 0.0000 . . . .
NOCD
00 Senior management occupations 0.367% 1.2364 0.0814
02 Middle and other management occupations 0.262% 0.9628 0.0770
09 Middle and other management occupations 0.463% 0.6797 0.0712
08 Middle and other management occupations 0.076% 0.6221 0.1628
01 Middle and other management occupations 1.182% 0.5535 0.0405
92 Processing, manufacturing and utilities supervisors and skilled oper. 0.227% 0.5198 0.0719
21 Professional occupations in natural and applied sciences 23.524% 0.4911 0.0176
9990 Software pilot (CIC) 0.003% 0.4769 0.3114
72 Trades and skilled transport and equipment operators 5.876% 0.4525 0.0198
07 Middle and other management occupations 0.370% 0.4368 0.0575
11 Professional occupations in business and finance 4.258% 0.4165 0.0222
22 Technical occupations related to natural and applied sciences 7.024% 0.3833 0.0195
31 Professional occupations in health 3.169% 0.3356 0.0252
95 Processing and manufacturing machine operators and assemblers 0.863% 0.3339 0.0369
65 0.037% 0.3279 0.1421
73 Trades and skilled transport and equipment operators 6.046% 0.3125 0.0197
04 Middle and other management occupations 0.009% 0.3010 0.3023
03 Middle and other management occupations 0.100% 0.2935 0.1773
05 Middle and other management occupations 0.235% 0.2922 0.0912
06 Middle and other management occupations 2.163% 0.2388 0.0310
41 Prof. occs in social science, education, gov. services and religion 4.552% 0.2372 0.0228
96 Labourers in processing, manufacturing and utilities 0.626% 0.2006 0.0435
32 Techical and skilled occupations in health 1.359% 0.1786 0.0294
74 Intermediate occs in trans., equip. operation, install. and main. 0.684% 0.1782 0.0458
76 Trades helpers, construction labourers and related occupations 0.731% 0.1650 0.0375
94 Processing and manufacturing machine operators and assemblers 1.725% 0.1443 0.0277
9999 Open employment authorization (CIC) 0.015% 0.1302 0.1906
82 Skilled occupations in primary industry 0.335% 0.1290 0.0684
62 Skilled sales and service occupations 5.939% 0.0824 0.0194
12 Skilled administrative and business occupations 7.058% 0.0813 0.0188
84 Intermediate occupations in primary industry 0.820% 0.0721 0.0355
34 Assisting occupations in support of health services 0.283% 0.0480 0.0669
14 Clerical occupations 2.464% 0.0444 0.0244
52 Technical and skilled occupations in art, culture, and recreation 1.122% 0.0094 0.0342
64 Intermediate sales and services occupations 4.287% -0.0068 0.2141
42 Paraprofessional occs in law, social services, education and religion 0.502% -0.0219 0.0425
9911 Student (CIC) 1.309% -0.0722 0.0335
51 Professional occupations in art and culture 1.473% -0.1043 0.0326
66 Elemental sales and service occupations 2.017% -0.1756 0.0249
9992 Retired (CIC) 0.039% -0.3035 0.1829
9980 Other non-worker (CIC) 0.067% -0.3679 0.1242
9970 Homemaker (CIC) 0.261% -0.4477 0.0700
Occupations are ordered by size of occupation effect.  
Occupational codes were supplied by CIC; they include aggregated NOC codes plus special CIC categories.
Occupational categories without observations in our sample are not listed.  